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Abstract 
MURPHY is a experimental methodology, which will include an integrated 
tool set, for building safety-critical, real-time software. Although it is lan-
guage independent, many safety-critical software projects are currently plan-
ning to use Ada. This paper presents the semantic templates for the verifi-
cation of the safety of Ada programs using Software Fault Tree Analysis. An 
example is shown of applying the technique to an Ada program, and the tools 
in the MURPHY tool set to aid in this type of analysis are described. 
1 Introduction 
A system or subsystem may be described as safety-critical if there are potential conse-
quences of using the system that are so serious that it cannot be used at all unless the 
probability of a high-cost event (an accident) occurring is very low. For example, a sys-
tern is usually considered safety-critical if a run-time error or failure can result in death, 
injury, loss of equipment or property, or environmental harm. When computers are used 
to control safety-critical processes, there is a need to verify that the software will not 
cause or contribute to an accident. Until relatively recently, although computers were 
used in such potentially unsafe systems as aircraft, air traffic control, nurlear power, de-
fense, and aerospace systems, a natural reluctance to add unknown and complex factors 
1This work was partially supported by a MICRO grant co-funded by the State of California and Hughes 
Aircraft Company 
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to these systems kept computers out of most safety-critical loops. However, the poten-
tial advantages of using computers are now outweighing apprehension (some might say 
good sense), and both computer scientists and system engineers are finding themselves 
faced with potential liability and with new government standards and requirements (e.g., 
MIL-STD-882B Notice 1) that require certification of software safety to a degree not yet . 
possible with current software engineering methods. 
In safety-critical systems, it is not unusual to have reliability requirements of 10-5 
to 10-9 probability of failure over a given period of time. This translates into require-
ments such as one failure per hundred years. Unfortunately, current software engineering 
technology cannot guarantee that such reliability is achieved for software (or, for that 
matter, even measured). Available evidence indicates that current software reliability 
figures are, at best, orders of magnitude less than required [2]. 
What can be done? One option is not to build these systems or not to use comput-
ers to control them. This option should be seriously considered by those making such 
decisions. The current rush to use computers to control nearly every type of device may 
involve a seriously unrealistic discounting of the potential risk. In some cases, reliability 
models based on totally unrealistic and unproven assumptions (e.g., [13] which is based 
on an assumption that has .been experimentally shown to be false [5]) are used to justify 
the use of computers. In others, the evaluation of risk appears to be based solely on op-
timism. One reasonable conclusion is that in safety-critical systems where the potential 
risk must be very low, computers should not be used as the sole source of control with-
out highly reliable back-up systems and independent (non-software) protection against 
software control errors. 
There are, however, systems where a realistic risk/benefit tradeoff might conclude that 
computer control is justified. For example, it is easier to justify the use of fly-by-wire 
systems in a military fighter aircraft than in a commercial aircraft. In these cases, a non-
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absolute approach to reliability may be possible. It is often not necessary for software to 
be completely correct in order for it to be safe; there are many types of failures possible in 
any complex system, with consequences varying from minor annoyance up to injury and 
death. For example, if the spacecraft software temporarily fails to archive some data for 
later analysis, the consequences are undesirable but not as serious as a failure involving 
the destruction of the spacecraft itself or non-fulfillment of the primary mission. 
It seems reasonable to devise techniques that focus on those failures with the most 
serious consequences. Even if all failures cannot be prevented, it may be possible to ensure 
that the failures that do occur are of minor consequence or that even if a potentially 
serious failure does occur, the system will "fail safe" (i.e., fail in a manner that does not 
have unacceptable results). 
This approach is useful under the following circumstances: (1) not all failures are 
of equal consequences and (2) there are a relatively small number of failures that are 
potentially serious. Under these circumstances, it is possible to augment traditional 
software engineering techniques that attempt to eliminate all errors with techniques 
that concentrate on potentially high-cost errors. These new techniques often involve a 
"backward" approach that starts with determining what are the unacceptable or high-
cost failures of the software and then ensures that these particular failures do not occur or 
that their probability of occurrence is minimized. Another way of looking at this is that 
a "forward" analysis attempts to ensure that all possible reachable states of the system 
are correct whereas the goal of backward analysis is to ensure that particular incorrect 
states are not reachable. The latter is practical only under the above assumptions that 
there are a relatively small number of failures that are unacceptable and that these can 
be stated. In practice, this is usually the case even in complex systems. For example, 
this type of approach has been applied to nuclear power plants, commercial aircraft, and 
missile defense systems. 
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The UCI Safety Project is developing an experimental methodology called MURPHY 
that will include an integrated tool set for building safety-critical, real-time software. 
There are currently three main areas of research: ( 1) software hazard analysis and re-
quirements specification techniques; (2) verification, validation, and assessment of safety; 
and (3) software design and run-time environments. This paper describes a technique , 
for safety verification of software written in Ada2 • Previously, Leveson and Harvey [6] 
developed a technique called Software Fault Tree Analysis and applied it to Pascal, and 
Leveson and Stolzy [7] demonstrated its use on the Ada rendezvous. This paper extends 
the technique to full Ada, provides an example of its use, and describes the tools currently 
completed and under development. 
2 Fault Tree Analysis 
A hazard is a set of conditions (state) that has an unacceptable risk of leading to an 
accident, given certain environmental conditions. System safety analysis involves de-
termining the hazards of a system and then either verifying that the hazardous state 
cannot be reached or that the risk is acceptable. There have been several system safety 
engineering techniques developed to accomplish this. One of these, Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), was developed in the early 1960's to analyze the safety of electro-mechanical 
systems [12]. Software Fault Tree Analysis [6] was derived from and extends FTA to 
systems containing computers as subcomponents. In FTA, a hazard is specified, and the 
system is then, analyzed in the context of its environment ·and operation to find credi-
ble sequences of events that can lead to this hazard. The fault tree itself is a graphic 
model of various parallel and sequential combinations of faults (or system states) that 
will result in the occurrence of the predefined undesired event. The faults can be events 
2 Ada is a registered trademark of the U.S. Department of Defense (Ada Joint Program Office). 
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that are associated with component hardware failures, human errors, or any other per-
tinent events that can lead to the undesired state. A fault tree thus depicts the logical 
interrelationships of basic events that lead to the hazard. 
The basic procedure in FTA is to assume that the hazard has occurred and then to 
work backward to determine its set of possible causes. The root of the fault tree is the 
hazard and the necessary preconditions are described at the next level of the tree with 
either an AND or an OR relationship. Each subnode is expanded in a similar fashion 
until all leaves describe events of calculable probability or are unable to be analyzed for 
some reason. 
Once the fault tree has been built down to the software interface, the hi r~h level re-
quirements for software safety have been delineated in terms of software behavior (usually 
involving outputs or lack of outputs) that could adversely affect the safety of the system. 
Unsafe software behavior may result from: 
• failing to perform a required function, i.e., never executing the function or not 
producing an answer, 
• performing a function not required, i.e., getting the wrong answer, issuing the wrong 
control instruction, or doing the right thing but under inappropriate conditions (for 
example, activating an actuator inadvertently, too early, too late, or failing to cease 
an operation at a prescribed time), 
• failing to enforce required sequencing, e.g., failing to ensure that two things happen 
at the same time, at different times, or in a particular order, 
• failing to recognize a hazardous condition requiring corrective action 
• producing the wrong response to a hazardous condition. 
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After the hazardous software behavior has been identified in the system fault tree, Soft-
ware Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) can be applied at the design or code level to identify 
safety-critical items and components, to detect software logic errors, to determine the 
conditions under which fault-tolerance and fail-safe procedures should be initiated and 
to guide in the placement and content of run-time checks to detect hazardous software , 
states, and to facilitate effective safety testing by pinpointing critical functions and test 
cases. If used in conjunction with a system simulator, the interfaces of the software fault 
tree can be examined to determine appropriate simulation states and events. 
3 Software Fault Tree Analysis 
SFTA works backward from the critical control faults determined by the system fault 
tree through the program code or the design to the s<?ftware inputs. The approach is 
similar to the backward reasoning used in formal axiomatic verification, but with a much 
more limited goal. That is, SFTA attempts to verify that the program will never allow a 
particular unsafe state to be reached, although it proves nothing about incorrect but safe 
states. Most real-time embedded systems have two goals: (1) accomplishing a mission or 
function, while (2) not causing harm in the process. SFTA is aimed at only the second 
goal. 
There are several reasons to separate the verification of these two goals. First, dif-
ferent approaches may apply. Furthermore, partial verification may be less costly and 
therefore more practical. Finally, government licensing agencies are often concerned only 
with safety with respect to granting a license to use the system. For example, the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission is concerned with the safety of nuclear power plants but 
not with whether they put out a certain amount of power or earn money for the utilities 
running them. Most safety-critical systems now have government licensing or certifica-
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tion requirements. Potential liability concerns also provide incentive to perform safety 
verification. 
Because the goal is to prove that the software will not do something, it is convenient 
to use proof by contradiction. In SFTA, it is hypothesized that the software has produced 
an unsafe control action, and it is shown that this could not happen since the hypothesis 
leads to a contradiction. If a path is found through the software and out into the 
controlled system or its environment that does not contain a logical contradiction, then 
the hazard is reachable and this needs to be considered in the design of the system. For 
example in a SFTA of a scientific satellite control program [6], it was found that the 
satellite could be destroyed if the input sensors detected two sun pulses within 64 ms of 
each other. The appropriate action in this case is to use run-time assertions to detect 
such conditions and simply to reject incorrect or unsafe input. In other cases it might 
be most appropriate to redesign the program, to initiate software recovery routines, or 
to redesign non-computer parts of the system. 
SFTA has been successfully applied in several real software projects. Its success 
appears to be related to the fact that it forces the analyst to look at the software in 
a slightly different way. That is, usually the programmer is concerned with what the 
software is required to do. SFTA forces the programmer or analyst to consider what 
the software is not supposed to do. It also starts from a separate specification (the 
system fault tree) and therefore can possibly find errors in the software requirements 
specification. The process of working backward through the software and out into the 
environment allows identification of the most critical assumptions about the environment. 
In the satellite example cited above, the designers and programmers had been entirely 
unaware that the software was based on an assumption about the minimum timing 
interval of the incoming sun pulses. 
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4 SFTA Applied to Ada Programs 
SFTA starts with the hazardous output and works backward through the code. The 
analysis proceeds based on statement-specific templates for generating the tree. Because 
the technique makes use of the semantics of the language in which the algorithm is, 
specified, the templates may be different for each language. The basic templates for 
Ada statements are shown in figures 1 through 16. The templates were designed by 
examining the statement semantics as defined in the Ada Language Reference Manual[l] 
and by analyzing the causes of frequently-made programming errors. In each template, 
it is assumed that the statement caused the critical event, and the tree is constructed by 
considering how this might have occurred. 
Assignment 
causes 
failure 
GfJ 
I I I 
Left side Right side Exception 
eval eval causes 
causes failure causes failure failure 
Figure 1: Assignment Template 
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Else part 
causes 
failure 
If-then-else 
causes 
failure 
i-th cond 
eval causes 
failure 
i-th then 
part causes 
failure 
Else 
body causes 
failure 
Cond false 
prior to if 
i-th then 
body causes 
failure 
i-th cond. 
true 
rior to if 
Figure 2: If-then-else Template 
Others clause 
causes 
failure 
Others body No cond. 
causes true 
Case 
causes 
failure 
Cond. eval i-th clause 
causes 
failure 
causes 
failure 
i-th clause 
body causes 
i-th cond 
true 
failure prior to case failure prior to case 
Figure 3: Case Template 
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Loop causes 
failure 
N-th loop 
causes failure 
Loop cond. 
eval causes 
failure 
Body causes 
failure 
on N-th loop 
Cond. true 
past N - l 
loops 
Figure 4: Loop Template 
Procedure 
call causes 
failure 
Procedure 
body causes 
failure 
Paramerters 
cause 
failure 
Figure 5: Procedure Call Template 
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Loop was 
never 
executed 
Timed 
entry call 
ca uses failure 
Select 
causes 
failure 
Selective wait 
causes 
failure 
(see below) 
Conditional 
entry call 
causes failure 
Rendezvous 
causes 
failure 
Time-out 
causes 
failure 
Rendezvous 
causes 
failure 
Cancel of 
rendezvous 
causes failure 
Statements 
after delay 
ca use failure 
Else body 
Else clause 
causes 
failure 
Delay 
causes 
failure 
Selective wait 
causes 
failure 
i-th cond. 
eval causes 
failure 
Else body 
causes failure 
i-th clause 
causes failure 
No 
rendezvous 
takes place 
None of Accept on i-th clause 
causes clause conds i-th clause condition 
failure true causes failure true 
Figure 6: Select Template 
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I 
Tasks 
not yet 
activated 
Abort causes 
failure 
I· 
I 
Tasks 
update 
vars 
Figure 7: Abort Template 
Block 
causes failure 
Exception 
causes failure 
Block body 
causes 
failure 
Figure 8: Block Template 
Code 
ca uses failure 
Incorrect 
machine code 
entered 
Figure 9: Code Template 
Delay 
causes failure 
Task delay 
ca uses failure 
Expression 
eval 
causes failure 
Figure 10: Delay Template 
12 
I 
Tasks 
in rendezvous 
Rendezvous 
causes 
failure 
Entry call 
causes 
failure 
Range 
out of order 
Figure 11: Entry Template 
Exception 
causes failure 
and 
Exception body 
ca uses failure 
Exception 
was raised 
Exception 
was 
propagated 
Exception 
raised 
locally 
Figure 12: Exception Template 
Exited 
wrong 
loop 
Exit 
causes failure 
Cond eval 
causes 
failure 
Figure 13: Exit Template 
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Actual 
param eval 
causes failure 
Exception 
handler 
exists 
Resources 
not 
deallocated 
Raise 
causes failure 
Wrong 
exception 
raised 
Exception 
handler 
causes failure 
Figure 14: Raise Template 
Return 
causes 
failure 
Child task 
never exits 
Figure 15: Return Template 
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Expression 
eval causes 
failure 
Task 
past call 
I 
Task past 
accept 
Rendezvous 
causes 
failure 
Fault Rendezvous 
in doesn't 
rendezvous occur 
(see below) 
Parameters Accept body Task aborted 
cause failure ca uses failure 
Calling task 
not at call 
No call 
exists in task 
Rendezvous 
doesn't occur 
Called task 
not at accept 
(see below) 
Task halts 
above call 
Called task 
not at accept 
0J 
I I 
No accept Task halts 
in called task above accept 
Figure 16: Rendezvous Template 
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Called task 
in other 
rendezvous 
I 
Called task 
in alternative 
rendezvous 
As an example of how the templates are defined, consider the template for a ren-
dezvous (figure 16). The event being analyzed (or 'failure') is caused by the rendezvous 
if either (1) the rendezvous not occurring could cause the failure or (2) the rendezvous 
does occur and a fault during the rendezvous could cause the failure. (If neither case 
holds, then the failure must have been caused by some prior statement, and the analyst 
must consider each prior statement in turn.) There are three ways a rendezvous could 
not occur: (1) the calling task may not be able to execute the entry call, (2) the called 
task may not be able to execute the accept, and (3) the called task may be able to execute 
the accept, but some task other than the calling task may have made an entry call on 
that accept and the called task proceeds with a rendezvous with this third task. If none 
of these conditions hold, then the rendezvous will occur, and the analyst must consider 
whether a fault in the rendezvous could cause the failure. To aid in this process, three 
cases are present in the template for the analyst to consider. In the first case, the values 
passed as parameters to the rendezvous are inappropriate and thus cause the failure. In 
the second case, the body of the accept statement contains a fault, which causes the 
failure. In the last case, the Ada Language Reference Manual notes that if a called task 
is aborted while it is in a rendezvous, then an exception will be raised in the calling 
task. The analyst needs to consider whether this exception could lead to the event being 
analyzed. If help is desired in that case, the analyst could consult the exception template 
(figure 12). 
During the template development, we have made the following assumptions: 
• The Ada program being analyzed is free from any syntax errors. 
• The implementation of the underlying virtual machines (e.g., compiler) are perfect. 
Although this may not be true, it simplifies the templates. If desired, fault tree 
analysis can be applied to the underlying virtual machines (software or hardware) 
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to verify that they do not contribute to a hazard. 
• The templates currently refer to faults made in the program body. The analysis of 
faulty declarations using fault trees is not included in this paper. 
• Some statements, particularly goto, are difficult to analyze by a backward trace· 
and are not included in this paper. 
Perhaps the simplest way to explain the use of the templates is to illustrate it by 
analyzing a simple example problem: 
A traffic light control system at an intersection consists of four (identical) 
sensors and a central controller. The sensors in each direction detect cars 
approaching the intersection. If the traffic light currently is not green, the 
sensor notifies the controller so that the light will be changed. A car is 
expected to stop and wait for a green light. If the light is green already, 
the car may pass the intersection without stopping. The controller accepts 
change requests from the four sensors and arbitrates the traffic light changes. 
Once the controller changes the light in one direction (east-west or south-
north) to green, it maintains the green signal for five seconds so that other 
· cars in the same direction may pass the intersection without stopping. The 
light then changes from green to yellow and remains yellow for one second so 
that any car present in the intersection may clear. The light then turns to 
. red while the light in the opposite direction turns green. 
A sample Ada implementation of the problem is shown in figure 17. Due to the 
asymmetric nature of the Ada rendezvous (e.g., the called task does not know the identity 
of the calling task), an initialization (lines 17 through 19 and 45 through 47) is needed 
to assign a direction to each sensor. This direction is passed to the controller when 
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1 procedure traffic is 
2 type direction is (east, west, south, north); 
3 type color is (red, yellow, green); 
4 type light_type is array (direction) of color; 
5 lights : light_type := (green, green, red, red); 
6 task type sensor_task is 
7 entry initialize (mydir: in direction); 
8 entry car_comes; 
9 end sensor_task; 
10 sensor : array (direction) of sensor_task; 
11 task controller is 
12 entry notify (dir : in direction); 
13 end controller; 
14 task body sensor_task is 
15 dir : direction; 
16 begin 
17 accept initialize (mydir in direction) do 
18 dir := mydir; 
19 end initialize; 
20 loop 
21 accept car_comes; 
22 if (lights(dir) /= green) then 
23 controller.notify (dir); 
24 end if; 
25 end loop; 
26 end sensor_task; 
27 task body controller is 
28 begin 
29 loop 
30 accept notify (dir : in direction) do 
31 case dir is 
32 when east west => 
33 lights := (green, green, red, red); delay 5.0; 
34 lights :=(yellow, yellow, red, red); delay 1.0; 
35 lights := (red, red, green, green); 
36 when south I north => 
37 lights := (red, red, green, green); delay 5.0; 
38 lights := (red, red, yellow, yellow); delay 1.0; 
39 lights := (green, green, red, red); 
40 end case; 
41 end notify; 
42 end loop; 
43 end controller; 
44 begin 
45 for dir in east .. north loop 
46 sensor(dir).initialize (dir); 
47 end loop; 
48 end traffic; 
Figure 17: Ada Implementation of Traffic Light 
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each sensor requests the controller to change the lights. When a car approaching the 
intersection is detected, the sensor for the corresponding direction executes line 21. The 
actual passing of.the car through the intersection is assumed to begin when the program 
execution passes line 24 of the sensor task. 
The trees in this paper make use of three of the standard fault tree symbols. A 
rectangle indicates an event that needs to be analyzed further. A diamond indicates an 
event which is not further analyzed, either because it is inapplicable to the statement 
being analyzed or because a contradiction is found. Finally, an oval indicates a condition 
normal to the operation of the system that contributes to the failure. 
The application of SFTA to this program is illustrated by analyzing the event where 
two cars travelling from the north and east of the intersection are present in the intersec-
tion simultaneously. The analysis proceeds by finding the causes of the event and their 
relationships. 
There could be many ways two cars travelling north and east could be in the inter-
section simultaneously (figure 18). The authors have chosen to examine the case where 
the north car enters before the east car clears the intersection 3 . After selecting the event 
to be analyzed, the next step in the analysis is to find recursively the possible subevents 
leading to the failure event. In this ex:ample, the authors have decided to explore (again, 
among several possibilities) the case where the sensor (east) task is in rendezvous with 
the controller task and the sensor(north) task bypassed the rendezvous point (null 
else). This implies that the signal was green when the car from the north approached 
the intersection, and it therefore entered the intersection without stopping. The tree 
indicates that the top event could happen if and only if both subevents occur. 
3In fact, the authors are aware of several other failure modes for this program. We have chosen to 
explore only one possible case as an illustration here. Interested readers are encouraged to try to find the 
other failure modes. 
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Cars present at 
north and east 
of intersection 
North car enters 
before east car 
leaves intersection 
Sensor(E) in 
rendezvous and 
sensor(N) at line 24 
~ 
I I 
Sensor(N) Sensor(E) 
at line 24 in rendezvous 
Figure 18: Top Level Fault Tree 
In order to determine how the sensor(north) task bypasses the rendezvous point, 
it is necessary to trace the program backward from line 24 (figure 19). Since the imme-
diately preceding statement is the if statement (lines 22 through 24), we attach the if 
template to the fault tree. A statement template is used here to offer the analyst sugges-
tions as to how the specific statement might cause the fault. Since it is known that the 
sensor (north) task bypasses the rendezvous with the controller (then-part) and that 
the else-part does not have any statements, it is possible to immediately terminate the 
analysis along those two branches. The diamond symbol ("undeveloped event") is used 
to indicate this. The refinement of the leftmost branch is quite straightforward. For the 
task to bypass the rendezvous, the lights (north) must be green and this must happen 
before the east car clears the intersection for the top level event to happen. 
The subevent "sensor(east) task in rendezvous" is analyzed in a similar way (fig-
20 
Eval of 
lights(N) 
causes failure 
Sensor(N) 
at line 24 
"if. (lights (N) /= 
green then ... " 
causes failure 
Eval occurs 
before 
E car clear 
Lights(N) 
= green 
before if 
Figure 19: Sensor(North) at Line 24 
ure 20). The template for the rendezvous is used here. Among the three possible causes, 
two are discarded immediately since the examination of the code indicates that there is 
no task abortion and that parameter evaluation (line 23) was not a direct cause of the 
event. While the former decision is obvious, the latter one represents a decision made by 
the analyst. The only branch left to explore further is the rightmost branch where the 
rendezvous body (line 33 through 35) causes the top event. Since the last statement in 
the body is not a direct cause of the event we are analyzing, the immediately preceding 
delay statement is analyzed. This represents a delay of 1.0 second in the yellow state 
as the light changes from green to red. The delay templates are used next. Since the 
possibility of the delay expression evaluation causing the failure can be excluded, the 
node "task delay caused failure" is examined next. The task delay is shown to be a cause 
of the event if the delay of 1.0 second is not enough time for a car to pass the intersection . 
. 21 
Sensor(E) 
in rendezvous 
Body of 
hen EI W causes 
Failure 
Previous 
statements 
cause failure 
Delay 1.0 
causes 
failure 
Task Delay 
causes failure 
1.0 second 
not enough 
time 
Figure 20: Sensor(East) in Rendezvous 
22 
In summary, the above fault tree analysis demonstrates that two cars could enter 
from north and east of the intersection simultaneously if the east car (which entered 
the intersection while the sensor (east) is in rendezvous with the controller) is unable 
to clear the intersection as the light changes from green to yellow to red. When the 
east light becomes red, the north light will become green simultaneously, allowing the 
north car to enter the intersection without stopping. The complete fault tree is shown 
in figure 21. 
In general, a software fault tree has one or both of the following patterns: 
1. A contradiction is found. The construction of the fault tree (at least for this path) 
can stop at this point since the logic of the software cannot cause the event. The 
example given above does not deal with the problem of failures in the underlying 
implementation of the software, but this is possible. There is, of course, a practical 
limit as to how much analysis can and need be done depending on individual 
factors associated with each project. It is possible to include assertions or exception 
conditions in the code to catch critical implementation errors at run-time if run-time 
software-initiated or software-controlled fault-tolerance and fail-safe procedures are 
feasible. Note that the software fault tree provides the information necessary to 
determine which assertions and run-time checks are the most critical and where 
they should be placed. Since checks at run-time are expensive in terms of time and 
other resources, this information is extremely useful. 
2. The fault tree runs through the code and out to the controlled systems or its 
environment. The example fault tree above shows one possible path to the hazard, 
and changes are necessary to eliminate it. 
The technique illustrated above can be used to analyze any Ada program subunit. 
Analysis of tasks and the rendezvous are performed as demonstrated in the example, 
eva occurs 
before 
E car clear 
if 
I= 
Sensor(N) 
at line 24 
ars present at 
north and east 
of intersection 
ort car enters 
before east car 
clears intersection 
sensor E m 
rendezvous and 
sensor N at line 24 
Sensor(E) 
in rendezvous 
0 y 0 
when EIW 
rev10us 
statements 
Delay 1.0 
causes 
failure 
Figure 21: Final Fault Tree 
24 
causes 
failure 
assuming that all communication is through a rendezvous. Although communication 
using shared global variables is not prohibited in the language definition, its use in tasks 
is unsafe since simultaneous reading and writing could result in an undefined and most 
likely undesirable state. Similarly, use of the goto statement is discouraged since it 
changes the control flow arbitrarily. 
Analysis of procedures and function bodies is straightforward (see (6] for a thorough 
explanation). Calls to procedures are analyzed using the procedure call template (fig-
ure 5). Since a procedure body is a sequence of simple or compound statements, it can 
be analyzed using the existing templates. Analysis of function calls is similar, and is part 
of the analysis of failures caused by expression evaluation. Packages and generics in Ada 
consist of subunit specifications and corresponding bodies. The bodies can be analyzed 
by examining the statements in each of the constituent packages, procedures and func-
tions, as appropriate. It is necessary to include the initialization body of a package, and 
the effect of instantiation on a generic in the analysis. 
The discussion above focuses on the application of the analysis procedure to Ada code. 
It is also possible to apply the same type of analysis to a design language. At the highest 
level of design, the analysis pinpoints the safety-critical components of the design. These 
can then be isolated for protection and further analysis, and fault-tolerance or other 
design features can be used. Careful design analysis has the potential for minimizing 
expensive verification procedures later in the development process. 
Software Fault Tree Analysis also has important implications in the reuse of Ada 
components and packages. Accidents often arise from problems in the interfaces between 
components of a system. A recent software problem causing the death of three people 
(3] involved the reuse of software components. The interface between components of a 
system is composed of the assumptions the components make about each other. In terms 
of one component, its interface is the set of assumptions it makes about its environment. 
A path through the component in a software fault tree can show the conditions in the 
environment under which that component will exhibit a certain behavior. If there is 
no such path through the software, then that behavior cannot occur. Even though 
. reusable Ada packages can themselves be highly reliable, this alone does not preclude 
the possibility of problems arising in the interfaces of the reused packages. 
5 Fault Tree Tools 
5.1 Fault Tree Editor 
The first tool in the MURPHY fault tree analysis tool set is an interactive screen-oriented 
fault tree editor[ll,10]. This tool provides the analyst with the capability of creating or 
modifying fault trees in a structured manner. The editor performs no checking of the 
semantics of the fault tree generated. A version of the editor now in development will 
incorporate insertion of statement templates into the tree. 
In figure 22 on page 24 a screen image from a session with the editor is shown. The 
analyst has just changed the connector (or 'gate') between the node labelled 'E in rendez., 
N at null' and its children by selecting the 'and' item from a pull-down menu. Other 
options available to the analyst allow modification of node shape, changes in its screen 
position or relationship to other nodes in the tree, adding or deleting nodes in the tree, 
and saving the tree for future reference or modification. The editor also provides graphic 
output of th~ fault tree by invoking the fault tree artist. 
5.2 Fault Tree Artist 
The fault tree artist takes the output format used by the fault tree editor and the .fault 
tree generator and produces a graph of the tree in a standard format. Using a set of 
26 
oftlilare fault Tree Analysis.Tool . 
Node Label: • Rendez., Nat nul~ 
Node Fault: 4ser(N) at null else 
Quit Store Load Tree 
Root Fault: • Present at E and N 
Fault Tree Name: Traffic.tree 
Add Mode: Add Child Node Help 
Session Name: Traffic 
Author: S. S. Cha 
Delete Node Refresh 
Mouse Buttons: ~ Select/Move node l;I Add child/parent to current node ~ Select an option 
I Print Form: ~ File: tim.ou\ I (c) Copyright 1986 Regents of the University of California 
Cars Present at E and N 
N Car Enters before E 
E in Rendez., Nat null 
mm 
Sensor(N) at null else Sensor(E) in Rendezvous 
Shape: rectangle 
Shape: circle 
Shape: oval 
Shape: diamond 
Shape: house 
Delete node 
Figure 22: Sample Editor Session 
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layout algorithms[9], the artist handles the positioning of the tree on paper, dealing with 
off-page connections if the tree is too wide or too tall to fit on a single sheet. Three 
types of output are provided: WID, for wide line-printer forms (14 by 8.5 inches), LPT 
for narrow line-printer forms (8.5 .by 11 inches) and PIC for output in the Pic[4) graphics 
language, which is translatable into either troff or TeX commands for final output. All 
fault tree illustrations appearing in this paper are produced by the fault tree artist. 
5.3 Prototype Fault Tree Generator 
A Fault Tree Generator is currently in development.4 This tool takes an Ada program as 
input and, based on that program and interaction with the analyst, produces a fault tree 
or group of fault trees as output. The initial prototype of this tool when completed will 
have two parts, a translator from Ada into an intermediate form and a tree generator 
to turn the intermediate form into a fault tree. Once the tree is generated, it could be 
displayed using the fault tree artist or edited using the fault tree editor. 
5.3.1 Translator 
The first part of the fault tree generator is a translator that reads in an Ada program and 
translates it into a control-flow graph, annotated with the fault tree templates appropri-
ate to each of the. input statements. The translator is being built using the Lex/Yacc 
tools. As the graph is constructed, all of the statement-specific terms in the associated 
templates are replaced by the appropriate source fragment. For example, an Ada as-
signment statement would be translated into a control-flow graph node annotated with 
a copy of the template for assignment statements (see figure 1). In that copy of the 
template the words "left side" and "right side" would be replaced by the source text for 
4 Note to reviewer: This tool will be completed, if all goes as planned, by the time that the final version 
of this paper is due. The text can then be changed to the present tense. 
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the left and right hand sides of that assignment statement, respectively. This part of 
the translation task is being designed so that revisions of the templates can be easily 
incorporated (i.e., the templates are independent of the tool itself). 
5.3.2 Prototype Tree Generation 
Once the translator has produced the annotated flow graph, the tree generator traverses 
the flow graph and generates a fault tree. The initial version of this part of the fault 
tree generator is highly interactive. The analyst supplies the initial (root) fault and a 
program location, specifies which statements are to be expanded as branches of the fault 
tree, and enters additional information (such as loop invariants) as necessary. At any 
point in this process, the existing tree can be saved for modification, display, printing or 
later development. Future versions of this tool are planned that will incorporate what 
has been learned from initial use of the tool and will increase the automation available 
to the analyst (such as including weakest-precondition predicate transformation). 
6 Conclusion 
A procedure for safety verification of Ada programs has been presented along with an 
example and a description of some prototype tools to aid the analyst. Since fault tree 
analysis was originally used to analyze safety in electromechanical systems, the technique 
being developed has the advantage of being able to link together the software system and 
the controlled system at the interfaces of the two, allowing the system to be analyzed as a 
whole. It can be used at various levels and stages of software development and, although 
not shown in this paper, can include failures in the underlying computer hardware. 
The basic technique of software fault tree analysis has been applied successfully in real 
projects on assembly language programs [8] and other simple sequential programs. This 
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paper extends the analysis technique to include Ada language constructs. Since many 
of the future safety-critical programs are planned to be written in Ada, the extension is 
necessary if this type of safety verification is to be accomplished. 
The reader is cautioned, however, in expecting too much from the technique. The 
analysis is very human-oriented, and therefore its success will depend on the ability of the 
analyst. The tools can aid the analyst, but do not guarantee success. SFTA, as defined 
here, is basically a form of structured walk-through. Its success in previous usage appears 
to be related to the fact that the analyst is forced to view the program in a different 
fashion than is common during development, and this increases the chance for finding 
errors. An analogy might be that when one vacuums a rug in one direction only, one is 
likely to pick up less dirt than if the vacuuming occurs in two opposite directions. That is, 
the more different ways a program is examined, the more likely that errors will be found. 
Programmers during development tend to concentrate on what they want the program 
to do; SFTA requires consideration of what the program should not do. However, the 
technique itself requires knowledge and experience on the part of the analyst and is not a 
substitute for any other type of verification and validation procedures. SFTA is just one 
part of the MURPHY methodology. In order to build software systems with acceptable 
risk, it will be necessary to make changes to and apply special procedures throughout 
the entire software development process. 
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